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When do states take human rights into account in their foreign policies?  This paper examines the 
relative role of human rights and economic self-interest in shaping aid policy during the era of 
globalization. 
 
I develop an argument that human rights abuses in the recipient state will prompt aid reduction or 
cessation by donors only when the recipient is neither economically nor strategically valuable to 
the donor. In the case of middle-power states, however, the donor will additionally refuse to 
punish states that are of strategic importance to major-power allies, such as the US. 
 
I then assess the hypotheses I have derived through quantitative analyses of the foreign policies of 
Britain, Canada, and the US in the years 1980-1996. In doing so, I extend my past research on the 
interaction of trade and human rights concerns in donors' aid decisions.   I trace overall patterns in 
the relationships between aid, trade, and domestic politics, as well as changes occurring as the 
boundary-centered world  of the Iron Curtain  dissolved into the 
interconnected politico-economic world of the mid-to-late 1990s. 
 
This research is designed to shed light on a question often raised in debate about the role of human 
rights in the foreign policies of democracies.  Are these rights, ostensibly at the heart of the 
democratic form of governance  something for which states are willing to sacrifice gains in other 
arenas  or are they only pursued when it is not costly (either economically or strategically)  to do 
so? This research takes at its starting point the often-observed inconsistencies in the foreign 
policies of aid-giving states towards countries that have dubious human rights records (for 
instance, the stark contrast between the US’s engagement with China and ostracism of Cuba).  
Inconsistencies are observed both in the treatment of different states with similar problems as well 
as between official rhetoric and action. 
 
Determining under what conditions human rights actually have an effect vis a vis other potential 
explanations of foreign policy decisions is important for at least three reasons. First, if states with 
the ability to set the international agenda fail to do so, a clear signal will be sent to leaders of other 
states that human rights can be costlessly sacrificed.  Second, in countries where respect for 
democratic values is supposed to be the basis of governmental legitimacy, a failure to respect and 
protect these rights internationally (let alone at home) represents an apparent contradiction of core 
principles. Finally, if certain states are able to multiply the impact of their foreign policy tools by 
affecting foreign policies of other states, treatment of states as unitary rational actors in the 
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What aims does foreign aid serve, and, moreover, whose aims? There has long been evidence, and 
it continues to mount (see, for instance, Lumsdaine 1993, Stokke 1995, Scharfe 1996), that 
foreign aid is far from purely altruistic and is often based on a panoply of considerations apart 
from the actual neediness of (and other conditions in) the recipient state. And yet it is commonly, 
and sensibly, assumed, that the aims that are pursued – be they strategic, economic, political, or 
otherwise-- are based on some overall sense of benefit to the donor country, even if that be only 
through creating the greater global stability that comes with succoring areas of the world which 
suffer the greatest need.  
And yet, is this a reasonable assumption about foreign policy in general?  Hegemonic 
stability theory (for instance, Keohane’s (1996) discussion) and recent world events suggest that 
the system leader can, in a variety of ways, create an incentive structure whereby allies act in 
ways more clearly in line with the system leader’s interests than what appear to be vital interests 
of the allies themselves.  Two US allies about which this claim is most often made are Canada, as 
the US’s closest developed neighbor, and Britain, with whom the US has always shared a “special 
relationship” and has been through most of the twentieth century one of its most notable and 
reliable military allies.  And yet, foreign aid patterns present a particularly rigorous test of US 
influence on its allies.  Foreign assistance should be an area of foreign policy in which we would 
expect to see less influence by the system leader on its allies, because , for Britain and Canada, aid 
has evolved largely as  a vestige of a colonial empire that the US did not share.  Therefore, in the 
following paper, I investigate a number of competing explanations about the most common – and 
most important – aims of foreign aid, with two foci.  One is the extent to which a system leader – 
currently the US – influences the aid decisions of middle –power states.  This is a question with                           
particular current relevance, not only given the US’s leadership role in the war on Iraq, but the 
4
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fact that Bush has sent clear signals that he wants to demonstrate  new American leadership in 
development policy (for instance at the 2003 G8 Summit in Evian, France). Though the US has 
been a traditionally stingy aid donor (proportional to the size of its GDP) Bush’s administration 
has been the first in decades to propose major foreign aid increases.  And though there have been 
questions about whether his administration’s aid proposals represent the most efficient use of 
funds, there have already been signs that the administration’s tactics may be working to encourage  
other donors to increase their aid – and possibly change their aid priorities—as well.  
While the process through which one state may take into account the interests of another 
may be exercised can be extremely complex and multifaceted, I adopt a very limited, but therefore 
straightforward measure of the effects of these calculations in the context of the present study of 
foreign aid.  A donor takes into account the interests of its allies if  
The second also question also arises in part from recent competing claims about the aims 
of foreign policy in general. Are human rights, ostensibly at the heart of the democratic form of 
government, something for which states are willing to sacrifice gains in other arenas, or are they 
are only pursued when it is not costly to do so? This question is often posed about the role of 
human rights in foreign policy but rarely addressed systematically. It is an especially critical 
question in a post-Cold War world, where policy-makers and academics alike celebrate the spread 
of democracy -- because when terms like ‘human rights’ become hollow, so does one of the 
organizing principles that defines democracy. More importantly, aid generally serves to prop up 
whatever regime is in power in recipient states. It tends to not go to the poorest members of 
society, and therefore ultimately exacerbates societal inequalities.  It is therefore important to 
understand who, and what, we are aiding. 
I do not pretend that these two questions need necessarily to go together – that taking cues 
from the US’s foreign policy stances, for instance, is likely to encourage our allies to take  human 
5
Barratt: Aiding Whom
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2005
Barratt  5 
Aiding Whom? 
 
rights into account in their foreign affairs to a greater extent than would otherwise be the case.  
But in both donor states that are the subject of this study, both human rights and the preferences of 
the US are factors that, on the one hand, have long appeared to have a role at least at a rhetorical 
level, and, on the other, have in the last two years regained a rather high profile in the array of 
possible foreign policy goals.  Systematically examining them in the context of recent history 
seems a good place to begin looking for answers about their true role. 
At least three other caveats are in order along the lines of what the design of this research 
does and does not allow us to test.  If we see that apparent US policy preferences are related to 
British and Canadian aid patterns, we can only infer many of the specific characteristics of the 
process that produces that statistical association.  These include 1) whether  US policy makers 
consciously attempt to influence the aid policies of their allies, 2)  whether policy makers in 
middle-power donor states intend  to take US policy preferences into account (the possibility htat 
the associations are spurious due to policy congruence between the US and each of the other 
donors is, however, controlled for), and 3) whether the relative extent to which US interests are 
reflected in ally aid policies is affected by changes in who staffs ministerial posts at various levels 
in the bureaucracy (the party in control of government overall is, however, taken into account).  
Fuller elucidation of these questions awaits far more extensive archival research than has to date 
been possible (and than has, in the case of Britain at least, apparently ever been done). 
Some Extant Answers 
 Democracies have a long record of committing blood and treasure to the cause of political 
and civil rights.  While realists argue that ethical concerns never matter in foreign policy, still 
democratic states and multilateral organizations provide billions of dollars in aid to non-strategic 
countries.   
6
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Britain and Canada are particularly interesting cases in that they provide unique tests of the 
roles of both human rights and the extent to which each takes into account the interests of the US 
in aid policy. First, British and (less dramatically) Canadian policy makers are often accused of 
slavishly following US policy cues in terms of putting strategic interests at the top of policy 
agendas (particularly during the lead-up to Gulf War II).  Second, Britain’s history as a colonial 
power, and Canada’s membership in the Commonwealth could be expected to make former 
colonial ties more important than some current economic and strategic concerns. Third, both 
Britain and Canada have been among the first signatories to a number of international human 
rights instruments and Canada has instituted a great number of explicit and far reaching human 
rights instruments domestically. A great number of general philosophical proposals about the 
propriety of including human rights in foreign policy, as well as specific linkage strategies for 
doing so,  have circulated around the highest levels of government, to a much greater extent in the 
Canadian case than the British (Scharfe 1996).  The relative role of competing goals in foreign 
assistance policy are addressed by at least three broad theoretical approaches to the study of 
international relations: realism, idealism, and neoliberalism. 
Realism. Certainly acting to further one’s own strategic interests through the assistance of 
valuable allies is well within the prescriptions of successful realist statecraft. Twentieth century 
realists since Waltz (1954) and before have argued that an ally’s goals may be valuable ones to 
help pursue if they also benefit oneself and one can in turn send a signal of reliability to the ally.   
But seldom, from a realist perspective, is the status of individual rights in another country 
important unless it affects state power. And realism has often given short shrift to the importance 
of domestic considerations to foreign policy makers. The results of this research, therefore, have 
interesting implications for testing the realist assumption that the imperative to survive in an 
anarchic international arena subsumes all other concerns.  If realist assumptions are valid, internal 
7
Barratt: Aiding Whom
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2005
Barratt  7 
Aiding Whom? 
 
characteristics of states can only have the most minor impact. The British case may prove an 
especially interesting test, as political discourse in Britain in the 1980s took a distinct realist turn.  
Says Larsen: ‘Power politics was seen as the true nature of international relations….’ (1997: 93-
4).  In fact, the realist view would still be confirmed if rhetoric acknowledges human rights but is 
not backed up by policy commitments.  
Scholars of Canadian foreign policy have generally proffered two kinds of arguments 
about the import of strategic considerations. The first is a structural Marxist strain that emphasizes 
Canada’s tendency to act in concert with other capitalist western states to maintain the 
international politico-economic status quo.  The second,  a strategic studies variant, focuses (or 
focused) on  the East-West conflict,  Canada’s interest in access to sea lanes,  and its concern for 
key trade intersections, considerations which are measured (but receive little support) in the 
analyses below. Since the latter perspective was driven by Cold War concerns, it would be 
evidence in its favor if trade intersections and like measures had a greater effect on trade 
disbursements before the dissolution of the Soviet Union than was the case in the 1990s.   
Nossal , for instance,  believes strategic interests generally receive greater priority by 
foreign policy-makers, and concedes that there indeed appears to be an inverse link between 
Canada’s perceived strategic stake in a state and the likelihood  that it will take action to alleviate 
human rights violations in that state: 
In the major cases of violations in the past decade, where “strategic concerns” have largely 
been absent, as in Uganda, Kampuchea, or Sri Lanka, Ottawa has taken a stiff stand 
against violations; where clearly identifiable strategic interests exist, it tended to play 
down violations.  Canada’s considerable ambivalence on South Africa, or its relatively 
muted concerns about Indonesia’s political prisoners or its invasion of East Timor, or its 
quiet diplomacy on human rights violations in Central America, or its indifference to 
violations in Iran in the 1970s, can be linked to the strategic importance of the states 
involved.(3) 
 
Similarly, Canada’s criticisms of Eastern Bloc human rights violations during the Cold 
War were much more vociferous than they were for comparable problems in Western donors, 
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much as was the case with the US and Britain (Skilling 1988).  As Nossal argues, “the Canadian 
government’s interest in human rights is considerably diluted by other interests.” 
Idealism and legal protections of human rights. Respect for civil and political human 
rights is at the heart of democratic governance.  International legal incentives to take human rights 
into account are supplemented in Britain by official Government rhetoric entailing a commitment 
to using human rights as criteria for aid disbursement. For example, in 1990, John Major, then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, advocated making aid conditional on democratic reforms in 
recipients (Burnell, 1991). That same year, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd claimed that 
promotion of good government and political pluralism was Britain’s official development 
assistance goal (Stokke, 1995:22). And the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has 
declared that foreign aid should be used to foster the ‘observance of human rights’ as well as 
democratic government (Burnell, 1997:156).  
 The serious consideration of human rights in Canadian foreign policy, as in British, begins 
in the 1970s, when increased global attention to human rights was spearheaded by Carter’s 
inclusion of rights as an administration priority in the US (Matthews and Pratt: 13, Nossal:46).  In 
fact, however, the first formally elucidated commitment to human rights by the government dates 
to 1970,  in the form of a white paper in which Pierre Elliot Trudeau’s Liberal administration 
committed to a “positive and vigorous” approach to human rights (Nossal:47).   
 Several other national and international trends combined in the 1970s to raise the profile 
of human rights discussions on policy agendas. Nationally, every Canadian province passed local 
anti-discrimination laws.  Several members of parliament sought to make overseas development 
assistance dependent on improvement in human rights conditions for the worst-violating 
recipients.  Canada signed on to the UN Convention on Racial Discrimination and Covenants on 
Economic and Social Rights and Civil and Political Rights, and the discussion before and after 
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these drew additional public attention to the issue of basic needs and basic rights, and whether 
there could be international standards thereof.  The passage of the Helsinki Final Act by the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe drew enhanced the new status of human rights 
in the public eye.   In addition, during debates over the UN Conventions and Covenants, the 
government established federal-provincial committees to identify and capitalize on links  between 
domestic and international human rights issues.  By 1988, Victoria Berry and Allan McChesney 
could note with optimism that “ for over two decades the Canadian public has expressed rising 
interest in the place of human rights in foreign policy” (Berry and McChesney 1988:60).  And 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s there was increasing verbal support for human rights among high-
ranking cabinet officials. 
However, as human rights gained more attention internationally, activists and 
representatives from other governments regularly criticized Canada for its lukewarm commitment 
to human rights abroad, and especially its failure to put to use the development assistance tools at 
the government’s disposal (Nossal: 47). 1  
Neoliberalism/ globalization perspectives. If trade and economic cooperation for mutual 
benefit between nations is a paramount concern of policy makers (Keohane 1993, Lipson 1993, 
Axelrod and Keohane 1993), some relations may be so valuable that the donor would rather 
continue to generate good will through aid than jeopardize access to the recipient by cutting it off.  
These are countries that offer significant trade potential to the donor, provide fertile export 
markets, and have large or expanding economies.  These countries are less likely to be punished, 
and if they are, punished less severely, than are other states for commensurate human rights 
                                                          
1 Prior to the below-mentioned reports, discussion of the motives behind Canada’s foreign aid did not even touch on 
human rights as a consideration.  Dobell (1972) notes the following motives behind Canada’s aid program to 
francophone Africa:  finding an outlet for francophone Canadians, the desire to preempt a Quebecois aid program in 
Africa, and the desire to outflank Quebec in its attempts to heighten its international presence.  He bemoans the 
failure of Canada to join Europe and the US in involvement with “far east”ern development efforts and the economic 
10
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abuses (Gillies, 1989; Scharfe, 1996). Currently, some observers note that when there is 
significant potential for trade with a country (in general more quickly developing states or NICs), 
human rights appear not to matter at all (Gillies 1989).  Gillies contends this discriminatory 
reatment of countries is a result of the extent to which an incumbent government’s quest for 
political survival is predicated on economic growth.  “This imperative is the foundation of the 
privileged position that business develops in the policy arena”  (1989:455).  And several examples 
suggest this is a pattern that has been borne out in Canada’s bilateral relations with several 
recipients.. As the trade-driven model presented earlier suggests, Canada “seems to fashion human 
rights policies with an eye fixed firmly on commercial interests” (Nossal 1988:49).   
(And  in fact,  currently  a good deal of the US’s  aid policy clearly has trade interests in 
mind -  for instance Bush has criticised European donors for their opposition to genetically 
modified food crops and for their continued support of export subsidies .  And the Europeans 
often characterise America's food-aid program itself as  in fact a  kind of  export subsidy  
(Economist  5/31/2003: 67.) 
The General Context of British and Canadian Foreign Policy Making 
The International Context.  
Britain’s connection to the US arguably shapes its foreign policy outlook more than does 
any other bilateral relationship (Smith 1988). The relationship has been, sometimes 
simultaneously, both a very close and a very contested one over the course of the 20th century.  
Even in WWII, when the two states were each other’s closest allies (and when Britain would very 
likely not have survived Hitler’s onslaughts were it not for the US’s assistance and eventual 
declaration of war on the Axis powers), British strategists worried about the potential US 
predominance in the Pacific (supplanting Britain’s own) that might result from US intervention 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
benefits they could render (103).  Even at the point, however, Dobell documents calls from, at the very least, the 
academy, for greater altruism in Canada’s foreign policy (97). 
11
Barratt: Aiding Whom
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2005
Barratt  11 
Aiding Whom? 
 
(French, 1993).  But on the other hand, some observers have argued, its relationship with the US 
has been one which has allowed Britain to extend its otherwise declining influence on world 
affairs, and therefore it might be argued that any reflection of US interests that we observe in 
British aid patterns are in fact strategically served. 
In aid policy particularly, many would currently question whether the present US 
administration  can claim leadership in aid policy with much legitimacy  (see for instance the kind 
of commentary  reflected in ‘Bush:  Hero or Hypocrite’ , Economist  5/31/2003: 67).  But British 
foreign policy has often been dismissed in recent months as simply rubber stamping American 
strategic preferences.  Whether or not this is strictly true, there do appear to be signs that British 
policy makers and activists are paying attention to the Bush administration’s most recent, very 
vocal machinations in aid policy.  For instance, after Bush announced new aid initiatives at the 
May G8 summitt, Bob Geldof (in a Guardian interview) dubbed the Bush administration’s 
commitment to African economic assistance the most significant since that of the Kennedy 
administration (Economist; 5/31/2003: 67).  
Conventional wisdom often dismisses Canadian foreign policy, including aid policy, as 
largely taking cues from its Southern neighbor.  But in fact, Canada has provided foreign 
assistance to a number of states with whom the US has had serious policy differences.  Canada has 
a multifaceted economic relationship with Cuba, for instance, consisting of not only foreign aid, 
but also private investment of Canadian firms in joint ventures with Cuban state-run corporations 
(Lane 1997). 
Formal Policy Making Institutions and Structure. Several characteristics of British foreign 
policy have particular relevance for the aid allocation process. Institutional inertia exists in every 
decision-making apparatus, but may exert a particularly strong effect in the British civil service. 
According to Wallace (1975:8), ‘the high morale and prestige of the British civil service, and its 
12
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successful resistance of the bypassing of its regular procedures by political channels, make the 
problem of organizational inertia particularly acute for policy makers in Britain.’  Additionally, 
the decision-making process about aid is one of the most difficult to trace in terms of its official 
institutional channels; looking at long-term overall factors in the aid decision can help one induce 
what one could not derive from official institutional arrangements. .  In spite of the fact that 
Canadian foreign policy has directed more rhetorical attention at human rights issues than has the 
British foreign policy making community, the incorporation of human rights concerns into policy 
practice has been impeded by the fact that human rights issues are  the nominal purview of 
numerous different governmental departments.  No unit perceives the need to make human rights 
a top priority,  because each knows human rights is in part the responsibility of some other 
department(s).  This lack of ownership by any one unit results in human rights issues becoming 
isolated and marginalized (Berry and McChesney 1988: 60), and means that there is an 
endogenous source of devaluation of human rights concerns and likely lesser degree of salience 
than is the case in analogous situations in other donors.  And because human rights are not and 
have not been included in any formalized Canadian foreign policy framework, the extent to which 
human rights considerations are represented on policy agendas (let alone become implemented), is 
dependent primarily on individual officials and politicians. 
Canadian institutions devoted specifically to human rights issues also are and have been 
temporary and ad hoc, as was the case with Parliament’s appointment of a special joint committee 
to consider the conditions under which Canada should concern itself with human rights violations 
in other countries. Similarly, when there was first discussion about Canada becoming a signatory 
to UN Conventions on various rights in the 1970s, the Department of the Secretary of State was 
the point of contact at the federal level -- but the Department of External Affairs gradually took 
over responsibility for the role of human rights in foreign policy.  Another example of the ad-hoc 
13
Barratt: Aiding Whom
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2005
Barratt  13 
Aiding Whom? 
 
nature of the development of rights policy is the formative role that individual, informal speeches 
have come to play in the policy process.   
Characteristics of the Aid Decision and Considerations Therein  
Since the end of WWII, the major donors’ aims for aid have been contested.  Generally, however, 
there have been four major goals. 
• Assisting strategic allies.  (This often includes former colonies or members of the 
Commonwealth, whose ‘strategic’ value might be debatable, but who are allies due to 
historical cultural, political, and economic ties, and who the donor wants to maintain as allies.)   
• Securing trade benefits for domestic businesses. (This is pursued largely as a result of the 
efforts of large, well-organized, and well-funded business lobbies in the donor.  Such trade 
advantages are usually pursued through strategies like ‘tied aid’ and special aid-for-trade deals 
or legislation such as the Aid and Trade Provision in Britain2.) 
• Pursuing general global stability through development and economic growth; though there 
is often a failure to distinguish between the two in practice  
• Achieving democratization and increased respect for human rights. (Development goals 
that do not have concurrent benefits to some sector of the donor’s economy are generally 
given far less attention than are strategic and economic goals.  Where they are taken into 
account, they are largely justified with reference to their utility as a means, rather than as an 
end.) 
Most authors argue that the first two of these are much higher on donors’ agendas than is the last.  
History of Human Rights in British and Canadian Foreign Policy.  Scholars of the role of human 
rights in British foreign policy often trace the roots of an explicit role for human rights in British 
foreign policy to the mid-1970s (Vincent 1986). But the late 1970s and 1980s saw little evidence 
14
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that such rhetoric was incorporated into policy practice.  In 1989, Cunliffe (1989: 115) could 
conclude that ‘analysis of the flow of economic aid from London to the less developed world over 
the past fifteen years does not reveal any enduring, concerted effects by successive British 
Governments to utilize the flow of concessional finance for the promotion of international human 
rights.’ In fact, as of the late 1970s, the UK had only cut off aid completely to two countries in 
response to human rights abuses. Moreover, when human rights had any effect at all, it was highly 
conditional: 
London’s relations with the Third World …have been dominated by …political, historical, 
and economic constraints which have drastically limited the extent to which …concern 
for…human rights has led to changes in…aid relations…[human rights] concerns are 
subservient to other political and economic ambitions in determining the quantity and 
direction of the aid programme (Cunliffe, 1985:112, 116). 
 
There is evidence of some improvement over the past decade, at least rhetorically.  The Blair 
government has argued that human rights should have a more significant role in British foreign 
policy.  Many of Blair’s initiatives reflect programmes begun under the preceding Conservative 
government, suggesting some linkage between aid policy and rights performance during the years 
of this study.  
Canada’s perceived lack of commitment to alleviating human rights  abuses abroad stands 
in stark contrast, as is the case with other donor nations, to apparent governmental concerns over 
rights violations – one of the apparent discrepancies this research attempts to explain.   In what 
Margaret Doxey (cited in Nossal: 48) has called the “rhetoric gap”,  there is “marked discrepancy 
between expression of concern and actual government behavior”.  In fact “in their public 
statements, political leaders and departmental officials stress that they are shocked and disturbed 
by evidence of human rights violations by other governments, that they believe such behavior is 
morally wrong”, and that Canada bears a responsibility to answer these violations in its foreign 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
2 An important side effect of this characteristic is that it is biased towards helping richer developing countries, 
something found in several of my analyses. 
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policy (Nossal:47).  Senior policy makers have for years adopted the stance of former Secretary of 
State Don Jamieson, who declared that “Canada will continue to uphold internationally the course 
of human rights, in the legitimate hope that we can eventually ameliorate the conditions of our 
fellow man” (Nossal:47).  Furthermore, the commitment has been at least ostensibly bipartisan, as 
the Conservative governments of the late 1970s and mid 1980s (Clark and Mulroney) made public 
announcements to this effect as well.  In addition, “senior cabinet members, most notably a 
number of secretaries of state for external affairs, have supported a significant role for human 
rights in foreign policy” (Nossal:47).  Such pronouncements have even been formalized, 
especially in the area of overseas development assistance and other aid.  Successive governments’ 
commitment to linking aid to human rights is laid out in several major documents, two of which 
(the 1986 Hockin-Simard Report and the 1988 Winegard Report, For Whose Benefit?) were 
reports to special committees in Parliament.  A report by the Canadian International Development 
Agency (Sharing Our Future, 1988) claimed that these new frameworks would “help make it 
more feasible to take human rights under serious consideration in the formulation of our aid 
policy” (quoted in Scharfe 1996:15). Whether or not these kinds of commitments have been kept 
is examined below.3      
Public Opinion/Interest Groups. Three categories of interest groups have been particularly 
well-organized around aid issues. 
Human Rights NGOs.  Policy results often turn on how the national interest is defined in a 
given situation. Therefore, one of the primary goals of human rights interest groups is to make 
human rights aspects of a particular aid decision appear to be of higher salience than other kinds 
of considerations.  Issue definition also establishes which components of the British policy-
making machinery will assume responsibility for an issue. In Canada, according to Berry and 
                                                          
3 Whether or not there is an actual change after 1988 is not currently examined, but certainly could be in future 
extensions of this research 
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McChesney, human rights first became a major topic of public discussion in the 1970s during the 
debates about Canada signing the various UN conventions on human rights and racial 
discrimination.  At that time, the first human rights NGOs gained popular notice and support (both 
symbolic and financial).  The presence of these organized interests required that greater 
government attention be devoted to issues of rights both at home and abroad. 
Business Interests. Wallace claims that ‘promotional groups and economic interests are as 
active in foreign policy issues as they are [in] questions of transport or educational policy’ 
(Wallace 1975:3).  Some trace the influence of business interests in foreign policy to Britain’s 
status as a middle-power state.  
By 1970… British policy makers and observers had alike accepted that Britain 
could no longer aspire to world status, but was rather a ‘major power of the second order.’  
Their perception of the national interest which foreign policy should pursue reflected the 
more commercial orientation appropriate to a middle power (Wallace:4)4. 
  
Viewing the role of business interests in Canadian foreign policy,  Matthews and Pratt 
(1985), Nossal, and Gillies all share the assumption that commercial interests will likely mitigate a 
donor country’s interest in pursuing human rights policy abroad. In Nossal’s judgement, Canada 
“…seems to fashion human rights policies with an eye firmly fixed on  commercial interests.”  
For instance, in examinations of Canadian foreign policy towards regimes which systematically 
violated human rights in Argentina, Chile, Indonesia, South Africa, South Korea, and Uganda by 
Keenlyside and Taylor (1984) and Scharfe (1996), there were found a “general reluctance to 
engage in economic sanctions against violators with which Canada has substantial and growing 
commercial interests”  (Keenlyside and Taylor 1984).. Gillies contends that discriminatory 
treatment of countries (on the basis of their human rights records) is a result of the extent to which 
an incumbent government’s quest for political survival is predicated on economic growth.  “This 
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imperative is the foundation of the privileged position that business develops in the policy arena”  
(1989:455).   
Immigrant Populations and Other Relevant Domestic Constituencies. Immigrant 
populations, while generally comprising a very small percentage of total population, can make a 
real impact if they are well organized and concentrated, as in the UK around the urban centers of, 
most notably, London and Birmingham, the largest current countries of origin being Pakistan, 
India, and Nigeria, in descending order. As Matthews and Pratt (1988:9) note about Canada’s 
immigrant communities, “where there is severe denial of civil and political rights in their 
countries of origin, immigrants and descendants are bound to be particularly concerned”.  
Therefore, these kinds of practical domestic politics concerns often reinforce any philosophical 
commitment the Canadian government might make to securing human rights within the borders of 
other countries.  While there are no reasons a priori to expect Canadian immigrant groups to have 
a greater impact on the policy process in Canada than in Great Britain, the analyses below test for 
their impact on the aid granting process. 
Hypotheses 
From the foregoing considerations, I derive the following hypotheses: 
1. Economic and strategic considerations are likely to be at least as 
strong an influence on aid decisions as are human rights considerations and 
neediness of the recipient. 
 




I assess the goodness of fit of these hypotheses using four different analyses for each of the 
two donors.  The first assesses the relative impact  of a number of characteristics of both the 
recipient itself, and of the donor’s relationship with it, on the probability that a given recipient is 
18
Human Rights & Human Welfare, Vol. 5 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 59
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/hrhw/vol5/iss1/59
Barratt  18 
Aiding Whom? 
 
granted aid. The second assesses the extent to which knowing US policy preferences gives us 
added information about these decisions, and the third weighs the relative importance of US vs. 
donor policy preferences. Finally, I assess the extent to which US policy preferences appear to 
drive ally aid based on a less comprehensive, but more costly, signal by the US of the strategic 
significance of a potential recipient: its own assistance to that state.  
Time Period to Be Covered. The unit of analysis is the recipient-year.  My analyses 
include the years 1980-1996, the years for which quantitative data on human rights is available. 
This is a particularly useful time period to examine, for a number of reasons.  It gives us over 
1000 cases in the decade before the Cold War ended, and over 700 in the six years after the 
breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, this time period includes aid responses of the West to 
genocide in both Africa and in the backyard of Europe. 
A model of the determinants of whether or not a potential recipient receives aid is  
estimated using pooled cross-sectional time series logit analysis, appropriate to 
dichotomous dependent variables for which the distribution of the error-terms is roughly 
log-linear, where one is interested in a large number of cases at several temporal points. 
A variable is included for aid at year t minus one to control for past aid and serial 
autocorrelation.   
Dependent Variable. Annual aid data was obtained from the OECD (various years).   
If a state was a non-creditor country in a given year, it was included as a potential aid 
recipient. It is more unusual to not  to  be granted aid from Britain than to be granted it. In a 
sample year, 1996, 119 of the 180 potential recipients received aid (Table 1).    Of the 69 states 
that did not receive aid (Table 2), eight of these were oil exporters and relatively wealthy; it is not 
surprising that they would not be aid priorities. Many others were island nations who receive large 
amounts of aid from geographically proximate states.   
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  A look at Table 3 demonstrates that it is also more unusual not to  be granted aid by 
Canada than to be granted it.  In 1996, 128 of the 180 potential recipients receive aid (in 
comparison to 104, for instance, which received  aid from Britain).    A look at the 60 states that 
did not receive aid (in Table 4) reveals that seven (Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, and UAE) are oil exporters and relatively wealthy, and  as was the case with Britain, 
others are island nations who receive a great deal of aid from geographically proximate donors. 
Few clear patterns emerge in an examination of the human rights records of the potential 
recipients left off the lists.  The numbers in parentheses indicate the human rights scores of these 
states (as discussed below, higher numbers indicate worse violation levels).  Forty (two-thirds) of 
these potential recipients were not evaluated by the State Department in 1996.  Seven had the best 
possible human rights score at 1, and ten others had scores of 2.  Only one, Burma, has a relatively 
poor score of 4, and none fall into the worst category, level 5.  Clearly, human rights in itself does 
not explain which potential recipients are left off the aid list. 
Independent Variables.  
1) Human Rights Abuses in Recipient Country. Human rights abuses  are measured using 
the Purdue Political Terror Index, originally compiled by Michael Stohl and including two ratings 
derived, respectively, from the US State Department’s annual country reports and those of  
Amnesty International.  This is a five-point scale ranging from one (‘Countries... under a secure 
rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional... Political 
murders are extraordinarily rare’) to five (‘The violence of Level [Four] has been extended to the 
whole population...The  leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness 
with  which they pursue personal or ideological goals’) (Stohl 1983).  The State Department 
measure was chosen, though not without trepidation. Key differences between the two scales are 
discussed in earlier (2002) versions of this research.  
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Many studies of human rights treat ‘democracy’ and ‘respect for human rights’ as nearly 
synonymous (Beitz, 1979: 179; Franck, 1992: 46-47; Ray 1998:442-3). However, one might also 
expect that democratic recipients might be less able to reciprocate aid with preferential trade 
agreements than are autocratic ones. This variable is included to test whether democracy is indeed 
a proxy for respect for human rights, and is measured as the recipient’s polity score on Jaggers 
and Gurr’s (1996) Polity III index. However, I expect democracy to be of lesser significance in 
predicting aid amounts than are economic and strategic measures. Additionally, many donors are 
reluctant to sink aid funds into unstable regions, which are often either undemocratic or 
transitional.  
 2) Potential and actual economic value of the recipient state. 
Potential economic value of the recipient to the donor, which I expect to be positively 
associated with recipient aid, is measured in two ways: size of the economy of the recipient 
(GDP), and annual growth rate of GDP.  Together, these two figures should give us some idea of 
how promising a trade partner the recipient looks to be. The recipient state’s population is also 
taken into account (CIA, various years). 
In addition, measurements of economic value are constructed that more specifically 
measure the recipient country’s trade potential. Volume and percentage of imports and exports 
between Britain and each recipient are drawn from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of 
Trade Statistics (various years) data. Since not all trade is created equal, I also take into account 
whether a recipient is an oil-exporting state.  
3a) Strategic value of the recipient state.   Realists would predict that strategic interests 
trump human rights concerns. A recipient with which the donor has had recent conflict or sees 
possibility of future conflict should be less likely to receive aid, because that conflict would 
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disrupt any benefit the donor would derive from its investment. However, such conflicts, at least 
militarized ones, are relatively rare. 
The strategic value of the recipient is measured in several other ways.  These measures 
include the geographic location of the recipient, proximity to trade intersections, location in areas 
of instability (CIA, various years) and whether the recipient possesses nuclear capabilities 
(Historical Statistics of the United States 1997).  If a state is listed as a participant in an interstate 
dispute, as a site of substantial civil unrest, or if it borders on such a state, it is coded as a site of 
instability. A state is coded as located at a key trade intersection if it contains major pipelines, key 
ports, or is on a major shipping route. 
I also take into account military commitments, measured as shared alliance membership 
taken from the alliance subset of the Correlates of War data set.   
In addition, donors that are geographically proximate to a recipient have a greater stake in 
that recipient’s fate. Geographical proximity is measured as distance in kilometers between 
London or Ottawa and the capital of each recipient.  
Finally, one of the most comprehensive measures of strategic interests are captured by 
similarity of UN voting records, measured using Signorino and Ritter’s (1999) S statistic in the 
Similarity of UN Policy Positions dataset created by Erik Gartzke, Dong-Joon Jo, and Richard 
Tucker .   I expect a priori for this to be a powerful predictor of whether a potential recipient 
receives aid, as it should capture a significant amount of the ‘shared policy outlook’ that would 
make a state an important strategic ally.  (And personal correspondence with members of the aid 
policy bureaucracy strongly suggests this.) 
3b) Strategic value of the recipient state to the US.  As is the case with the donors 
themselves, there are both qualities of the recipient itself that might make it valuable, and then 
also those characteristics of the relationship between the recipient and various donors that could 
22
Human Rights & Human Welfare, Vol. 5 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 59
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/hrhw/vol5/iss1/59
Barratt  22 
Aiding Whom? 
 
function independently in determining that recipient’s aid fate.   Therefore, to test whether 
knowing US(system leader) interests helps us predict recipient aid status above and beyond what 
we can predict by knowing the recipient’s relationship with the donor, I take into account two 
measures of the relationship between the US and the recipient: its Similarity of UN Policy 
Positions score, and then, to take into account a more costly signal, US aid to the recipient.  I take 
into account only military assistance, as it is the subcategory most likely to be targeted at 
recipients whose value is primarily strategic (rather than say recipients that were getting aid based 
primarily on neediness).   In models where I include this measure, I also control for similarity of 
UN policy stances with those of the donor state in question. 
Additional control variables – both gatekeeping and allocation decisions.  Five other 
categories of variables are included as controls. 
4) Mass mediated humanitarian crises. Determining whether a recipient suffered a 
humanitarian crisis (that was widely publicized in the mass media) allows one to measure 
economically based altruism5 as well as public awareness.  This variable is a count of headlines in 
print news as compiled under the coding scheme used for the Kansas Events Data Set (KEDS) and 
its Protocol for the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action (PANDA) subset 
(http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/ponsacs/panda.htm).  If states are taking into account the needs of 
recipients, the presence of a humanitarian crisis should be positively associated with a recipient’s 
aid status.  
           5) Domestic Politics. Convincing policy makers that human rights is the most 
important lens through which to examine a particular decision is often the goal of human rights 
NGOs, and I therefore include a count of all reported demonstrations in Britain and Canada in a 
given year regarding the human rights record of the recipient 
                                                          
5 This control is also included in the interest of replicabililty (it is included in many studies of US aid  (Cingranelli 
and Pasquarello, 1985; Poe, 1990, 1991)). 
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(http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/ponsacs/panda.htm).6 In addition, the presence of a large 
immigrant diaspora in the UK or Canada may be successful in lobbying for aid for its country of 
origin; therefore I also include the number of immigrants in the past ten years to the UK from the 
recipient country.  
6) Former colonial status of recipient.  I control for whether a recipient is a former British 
colony (Flags of the World, 2003); colonial ties promote a tradition of financial support and 
account for a good deal of variation in aid amounts between recipients (Lumsdaine, 1997; Maizels 
and Nissanke, 1984).  
7) End of the Cold War. British and Canadian policy makers might see themselves as less 
constrained by strategic concerns and freer to allocate aid according to either economic or human 
rights criteria. In addition, with the end of the Cold War, British policymakers have aspired to 
restore its role as a major player in world politics, using aid as one instrument.  Finally, with 
shrinking security budgets, aid becomes a more versatile (and available) policy tool than was 
heretofore the case. Whether the aid year occurs during the Cold War is measured as a dummy 
variable – coded one before and including 1991 (when the Soviet Union finally broke apart), zero 
after.  I expect more states to get aid, but less of it, after the Cold War ends  (and have 
demonstrated this in related research (Barratt, forthcoming). 
Because it is probable that in the less rigid strategic atmosphere of the post-cold war 
world, human rights would have a better chance of being a criteria in aid decisions, I include an 
interaction term to determine whether the effect of human rights considerations is greater after the 
cold war.  
                                                          
6 Ideally, I would have obtained measures of the amount and intensity of campaigning done on behalf of particular 
human rights crises from the major human rights interest groups themselves. However, both Amnesty and Human 
Rights Watch claim not to keep records of this kind or any other that would lend itself to systematic analysis – not 
even a financial audit that would contain country-specific line items. 
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             8) Past aid.  Past aid is a key determinant of present aid, because appropriations 
are often left unchanged as a result of institutional inertia (personal correspondence). In the 
gatekeeping model, whether a state received aid in the previous year is measured as a 
dichotomous dummy.  In the allocation model, past aid is measured as the overall aid amount to 
that state in the previous year.  Despite the fact that I use several measures of economic 
importance of the recipient and strategic importance of the recipient, and two measures of some 
other characteristics of recipient or of the donor-recipient relationship, there is little collinearity 
between the independent variables. In fact, out of 220 pairs, there are only seven sets of variables 
that correlate at over 0.47, and none that correlate at under -0.4. 
Results 
Britain. Scholars have expressed much of the same skepticism about humanitarian rhetoric 
in the UK (and elsewhere in Europe) as they have in the case of the US, arguing that ‘calls for the 
protection of others’ rights have not led to serious commitments’ (Brewin 1986:189).  In addition, 
scholars of British foreign policy have clearly perceived that allocation of foreign policy resources 
almost always necessitates tradeoffs (Vincent 1986).    
Hypothesis 1 stated that economic and strategic considerations are likely to be at least as 
strong an influence on aid decisions as are human rights considerations and neediness of the 
recipient. 
 The results of a logit analysis designed to test the relative relationships to aid of donor 
strategic concerns, economic interests, and human rights is presented in the first column of Table 
5.  Human rights record of the recipient has no effect, though recipient democracy score has a 
                                                          
7 Recipient’s nuclear capabilities and location at a trade intersection, recipient’s location in an area of instability and 
at a trade intersection, size of immigrant population in the UK and the recipient’s location at a trade intersection, UK 
exports to the recipient and imports from it, UK exports to the recipient and whether the recipient was a location of 
humanitarian crisis, UK imports  to the recipient and whether the recipient was a location of humanitarian crisis, the 
recipient’s population and whether it possesses nuclear capabilities, the recipient’s population and its immigrant 
presence in the UK, and the interaction variable with one of its components (the Cold War period). 
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marginally positive effect on the probability of receiving  aid. (While it may seem surprising that 
the democracy level would be significant while the human rights score would not, it should be 
recalled that they do measure quite different things; with the human rights score often reflecting 
social and economic rights violations not  captured in Polity’s political and civil measures of 
democracy, for instance).  While few economic measures come into play, either of the recipient 
itself or of the relationship between the recipient and the donor,  strategic measures certainly do.  
Potential recipients that are closer to the UK are much more likely to receive aid than those that 
are not. Policy similarity (as measured through UN votes) also has a positive and significant 
impact on the probability a state receives aid. More states receive aid after the Cold War, which 
may be a sign of policy influence in itself, as donors feel free to disburse their aid more widely (or 
may wish to do so to hedge their bets).  No measures of domestic politics are significant, save for 
the highly significant impact of having received aid in the past, indicating a substantial level of 
inertia. Clearly strategic concerns, at least for Britain in this time period, trump both humanitarian 
ones (despite the claims of official rhetoric) and more crass commercial ones (despite the fears of 
anti-globalization activists) in making aid decisions.  
In the second column of Table 5, we can examine the value added of knowing US policy 
positions.  And in fact, at first blush, there appears to be little.  Once again, recipient democracy 
score  has a positive impact on the likelihood it will receive aid, and we do see a significant 
change in that, once we control for US policy similarities with the recipient, recipient need  is 
significantly associated with the probability of receiving aid (the negative association between 
recipient economic growth and aid). Potential recipients that are closer to the donor are still more 
likely to receive aid. But not only does the policy similarity score for the US not achieve 
significance, but now the measure of UK policy preferences does not either. Moreover, the 
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percent of cases our model predicts correctly is essentially the same as it was before we took into 
account US policy preferences. 
What does this tell us?  Should we reject Hypothesis 2  - that system leader policy 
preferences are likely to help explain ally aid choices -in toto? Are no policy cues provided by the 
supposed system leader, the US? On the contrary – the third column in Table 5 demonstrates that, 
substituted in for UK policy preferences, US policy preferences are actually a slightly better 
predictor of UK aid choices!  So the reason that neither was significant in the prior analysis is 
likely that they cancelled each other out due to collinearity, and in fact the two measures do 
correlate at .77.  Nonetheless, it is a striking result that US interests could be  a better predictor of 
a donor’s aid decisions than that donor’s own preferences.  
Finally, keeping the basic model, I examined the value added of taking into account US 
strategic interests as indicated by a costlier signal:  where the US actually spends its military 
assistance dollars. While the PPC measure of explanatory power of the model changed little, as 
did the significance level and direction of most of the independent variables, the new measure was 
marginally significant, even accounting for UK policy preferences (remember that the earlier 
measure of US interests was not).   Clearly, evidence exists of  allies (consciously or not) taking 
into account US policy interests– even in the area of foreign aid.  
For a more intuitive interpretation of the coefficients for significant variables in these 4 
analyses, please see Table 6, which presents marginal effects on the probability of a state 
receiving aid of a one-unit change in each independent variable. The two variables with the most 
substantial effects, once again, are those of policy similarity and aid inertia. A one-unit change in 
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Canada. What of the US’s closest geographical ally?  While Canada’s foreign aid calculus  
appears to be less exclusively strategic than is Britain’s, there still appears to be some  association 
between US interests and Canadian policy outcomes. The first column in Table 7 presents, as was 
the case with Britain, the results of a logit analysis designed to test the relative relationships to aid 
of donor country strategic concerns, economic interests, and human rights.  Again, the latter 
appears to have little effect (though in fact, given the apparent policy influence the US is able to 
exercise, and the content of US foreign policy rhetoric, we might expect it even if the two donors 
examined here did not regularly invoke such rhetoric themselves).  The potential recipient’s level 
of democracy again is positively associated with the probability it gets aid, but a number of other 
factors are associated with Canadian aid patterns that were absent in the UK case. The recipient’s 
presence at a trade intersection (which could be read as both an economic and strategic boon), is 
in fact negatively associated with the probability it receives aid, a result that seems rather 
surprising.  Some light may be shed on this by the fact that several other measures of trade value 
of a state (being an oil exporter, or the volume of one’s total exports to Canada)  are also 
negatively associated with the likelihood that one gets aid.  If one considers what kind of states are 
likely to have these characteristics, however, they are likely to be states that are, while still 
developing, not among the poorest of the poor. Therefore, this pattern indicates a Canadian 
favoring of those states most in need, rather than those most likely to be commercially valuable.  
The fact that states with larger populations are also more likely to receive aid suggests this 
possibility as well.  
Strategic considerations do also appear to be strongly associated with Canadian aid 
patterns; similarity of UN policy positions is  highly significant predictor, and any given state is 
more likely to receive aid after the Cold War – a similar diffusion process to that observable in 
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British aid patterns.  Once again, whether a state received aid in the previous year is the single 
best predictor of whether it will receive aid in the current year.  
The second column in Table 7 presents the results of an analysis designed to test 
Hypothesis 2. At first, as was the case with Britain, taking into account US policy preferences  
appears to make little difference to the explanatory value of the model.   And yet, remarkably, the 
significance, size, and direction of the Canada policy preferences measure is very robust to 
inclusion of the US policy positions variable, which almost completely obscured the impact of the 
Britain policy positions variable in the last set of analyses.  The US policy positions measure, 
meanwhile, appears to have no impact at all. Canada’s foreign aid policy seems to be quite 
independent of the preferences of its larger southern neighbor. (And in fact, the correlation 
between the two is much lower than was that of the US-UK pair, though still not negligible at 
.57).   
To test this, we can observe the results (in the third column of table 7) of the analysis of  
Canadian aid decisions when US policy preferences are substituted in for Canadian ones.  The US 
measure still fails to achieve statistical significance, and there is little other effect on the predictive 
power of the model, other than the PPC being slightly lower.  Finally, even the more “costly” (and 
thus, one might imagine, meaningful) measure of US interests (US military assistance), included 
in the final analysis in Table 7, fails to either achieve significance or boost the PPC by much.  The 
only real effect on the analysis is that the two measures I interpreted as demonstrating the impact 
of need now fail to achieve significance, perhaps demonstrating the impact of need in the 
American program as well.  
Once again, more intuitive interpretations of the impact of the independent variables are 
presented in Table 8.  Again, this presents marginal effects on the probability of a state receiving 
aid of a one-unit change in each independent variable. The two variables with the most substantial 
29
Barratt: Aiding Whom
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2005
Barratt  29 
Aiding Whom? 
 
effects, once again, are those of policy similarity and aid inertia. A one unit change in each of 
these variables increases the probability of a state getting aid by close to or more than one 
standard deviation. 
Conclusion and Implications 
So, in a world where the current US administration appears to favor unilateralism, and yet 
an increasing number of problems (world poverty, environmental degradation, and human rights 
abuses, for instance) appear to require multilateral cooperation, what role do the policy 
preferences of the US appear to play in the aid patterns of two of the US’s closest allies? And to 
what extent do those patterns appear to rest on the extent to which recipients appear to perform to 
basic human rights standards, as required in the aid rhetoric of both Canada and Britain?  The 
answer to the latter appears to be a bit more straightforward than the answer to the first. 
Britain. Scholars have expressed much of the same skepticism about humanitarian rhetoric 
in the UK (and elsewhere in Europe) as they have in the case of the US, arguing that allocation of 
foreign policy resources almost always necessitates tradeoffs (Vincent 1986).   Hypothesis 1, 
therefore, stated that economic and strategic considerations are likely to be at least as strong an 
influence on aid decisions as are human rights considerations and neediness of the recipient. 
 The results of a logit analysis designed to test the relative relationships to aid of donor 
country strategic concerns, economic interests, and human rights were presented in the first 
column of Table 5.  Human rights had no effect, though recipient democracy did have a 
marginally positive effect. While few economic measures come into play, strategic measures such 
as distance, the end of the Cold War,  and policy position similarity certainly do.  No measures of 
domestic politics matter, save for the highly significant impact of having received aid in the past. 
Strategic concerns, at least for Britain in this time period, trump both humanitarian concerns and 
more commercial ones in making aid decisions.  
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The second column of Table 5 presented the value added of knowing the similarity 
between US policy positions and that of the recipient.  And in fact, at first blush, there appeared to 
be little.  But not only did the policy similarity score for the US not achieve significance, the 
measure of UK policy preferences did not either. Moreover, the percent of cases our model 
predicts correctly is essentially the same as it was before we took into account US policy 
preferences. 
But, rather than indicating that we should reject H2 altogether,  the third column  in Table 
5 actually demonstrated that, substituted in for UK policy preferences, US policy preferences were 
a slightly better predictor of UK aid choices at this stage than were UK policy preferences 
themselves!  This is a remarkable result that bears further investigation with a wider variety of 
measures, but at least in the current context, it can not be dismissed as simply the result of a 
spurious result stemming from a similarity of US and British policy portfolios, because such 
congruence is controlled for.  
Finally, keeping the basic model, I examined the value added of taking into account US 
strategic interests as indicated by a costlier signal – where the US actually spends its military 
assistance dollars. The new measure was marginally significant, even accounting for UK policy 
preferences.   Clearly, evidence exists for there being a strong and persistent relationship between 
US policy preferences and UK foreign assistance patterns.   
Canada.  While Canada’s foreign aid calculus  appeared to be less exclusively strategic      
than is Britain’s, there still appeared to be some  association between US interests and Canadian 
aid policy outcomes. The first column in Table 7 presented the results of a logit analysis designed 
to test the relative relationships to aid of donor country strategic concerns, economic interests, and 
human rights.  Again, the latter appeared to have little effect. The potential recipient’s level of 
democracy again was positively associated with the probability it received aid, and a  number of 
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apparently beneficial trade-related characteristics were negatively associated with the probability a 
potential recipient received aid.  This pattern could be interpreted as indicating that Canadian aid 
patterns favored those states most in need, rather than those most commercially valuable.   
Strategic considerations also appear to be strongly associated with Canadian aid patterns, 
including most significantly similarity of UN policy positions and past aid history.  
The second column in Table 7 presented the results of an analysis designed to test 
Hypothesis 2. In stark contrast to the British analyses, the significance, size, and direction of the 
Canadian policy congruence measure was very robust to inclusion of the US policy congruence 
variable.. When US policy congruence was substituted in for Canadian, the US measure still 
demonstrated no statistically significant association with which recipients were granted aid by 
Canada.  Finally, even the more “costly” measure of US interests (US military assistance), 
included in the final analysis in Table 7, failed to either achieve significance or boost the PPC by 
much.   
This study aimed to begin to answer two questions: that of the relative role of altruism and 
various forms of self-interest in foreign aid patterns, and the role of dominant powers in the 
system in shaping the aid decision patterns of others.  
In doing so, I build on earlier work distinguishing the different aid calculi that exist for 
different categories of recipients, and I add a more specific measure of the strategic value a 
recipient may have for a donor.  Human rights abuses continue apace despite the fact that 
policymakers and activists in democratic states profess a firm commitment to civil and political 
rights.  Determining when and why states take action in defense of those goals helps us 
understand why so many continue to be denied basic political and civil liberties, and what can be 
done about it by states that possess the resources to encourage change. 
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In addition, I begin to try to more systematically interrogate the conventional wisdom 
around US dominance of the international system.  While the analyses I have conducted reveal a 
connections between US policy congruence with a recipient and the likelihood that recipient is 
granted aid by Britain, another close ally’s (Canada) aid patterns do not, though they might be 
expected to. In addition, these patterns are just that—patterns –and the processes that generated 
them need to be investigated more thoroughly and disentangled with greater nuance than has been 
possible in the context of this paper. For instance, it is unclear whether the apparent association of 
US policy preferences with British aid outcomes is due in part to spurious correlation between the 
US’s and UK’s sets of policy preferences, or whether there is  a true cueing process occurring.  
While anecdotal evidence seems to suggest there is, archival research to date does not substantiate 
such a claim. One possible reason for this might be if British interests have come to be so closely 
aligned with US ones that they appear to be one and the same.  However, given how much British 
assistance is focused on former colonies, this seems unlikely.  
The results of this investigation beg other questions which, as noted at the outset of this 
investigation, must remain unanswered in the context of the current research.  Though we saw that 
apparent US policy preferences were related to at least British aid patterns, we can only infer 1) 
whether  US policy makers consciously attempt to influence the aid policies of their allies, 2)  
whether policy makers in middle-power donor states intend  to take US policy preferences into 
account (the possibility that the associations are spurious due to policy congruence between the 
US and each of the other donors was, however, controlled for), and 3) whether the relative extent 
to which US interests are reflected in ally aid policies is affected by changes in who staffs 
ministerial posts at various levels in the bureaucracy (the party in control of government overall is, 
however, taken into account).  Fuller elucidation of these questions awaits far more extensive 
archival research.  
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What this paper presents, then, are the beginnings of some answers, and a good deal many 
more questions.   The one thing that may be beyond question is that the task of improving the 
economic, social, civil, and political lot of people in all states must be a multilateral endeavor, and 
must be one in which all wealthy nations perceive an interest.  Discerning how such decisions are 
now made is therefore essential.  
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States That  Did Not Receive Aid From Britain, 1996 
 










Burkina Faso (na) 
Burma (4) 
Cape Verde (na) 
Comoros (1) 
Cook Islands (na) 
Djibouti (2) 
Dominican Republic (3) 
El Salvador (2) 
EquitorialGuinea (3) 
Estonia (2) 
Falkland Islands (na) 
Fiji (na)  






Hong Kong (na) 
Israel (3) 
Kiribati (na) 











New Caledonia (na) 
Niue (na) 
Northern Marianas (na)  
Oman (2)*  
Palau (na) 
Panama (2)  
Papua New Guinea (3)  
Qatar (na)* 
South Africa (4) 
Saudi Arabia(2)* 
Singapore (1) 











United Arab Emirates (1)* 
Venezuela (5) 
Wallis and Fortuna (na) 
Windward Islands (na) 
Western Samoa (na) 
(#)= State’s Human Rights Score (US State Department) 
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Costa Rica  
Croatia  
Cuba  
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Table 4 
States That  Did Not Receive Aid From Canada, 1996 
Anguilla (na) 










Cook Islands (na) 
Cyprus (1) 
Estonia (2) 
Falkland Islands (na) 
Fiji (na)  








Korea, Democratic Republic of  
(na) 













New Caledonia (na) 
Niue (na) 





Solomon Islands (na) 
St. Helena (na) 
St. Kitts (na) 
St. Lucia (na) 






Turks and Caicos (na) 
Tuvalu (na) 
United Arab Emirates (1)* 
Uzbekistan (2) 
Vanuatu (na) 
Virgin Islands (na) 
Wallis and Fortuna (na) 
Western Samoa (na) 
(#)= State’s Human Rights 
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Table 5: Pooled Cross Sectional Probit Analysis of Whether a State Received Aid – Britain 
Variable Coefficient (Robust Standard Error in Parentheses) 
 Basic Model 
Including Similarity of 
UN Votes – Recip. 
&Britain 
Including Similarity 
of Recip.’s UN 
Votes with Both US 
& Britain 
Including Similarity of 
UN Votes – Recip. 
&US 
Including Similarity 
of UN Votes – 
Recip. & Britain, & 
US Mil. Assistance 
Human Rights  
 






























UK Imports from Recip. -.000 
(.001) 
-.001    
(.001) 






















Recipient GDP Growth -.030 
(.017) 
-.034(marg)    
(.018) 














Nuclear Capabilities -11.727 
(1990000) 
-10.928     
(4469324) 




Distance -.000***    
(.000) 
-.000***    
(.000) 
































.986*    
(.401) 
 


























































US Military Assistance to 
Recip. 
   .000 (marg) 
(.000) 
Model Significance .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
N 1402 1402 1402 1402 
Percent Predicted Correctlly .56 .55 .57 .56 
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Table 6: Marginal Effects for Significant Variables - Britain 
Variable Marginal Effects On Change in Probability of Receiving Aid of A One-Unit Change in 
Independent Variable 
 Basic Model Including 
Similarity of UN Votes 
– Recip. &Britain 
Including Similarity 
of UN Votes – 
Recip. &US 
Including Similarity of 
Recip.’s UN Votes 
with Both US & 
Britain 
Including Similarity of 
UN Votes – Recip. 
and Britain, & US 
Military Assistance 
Recipient Polity Score .012 .014 .014 .013 
Recipient GDP Growth  -.035 -.034 -.004 
Distance 
 
-.000 -.000 -.000 -.000 
UN Policy Similarity - 
Recip. and Britain 
.956   .956 
UN Policy Similarity - 
Recip. and US 
 .986   
Cold War 
 
.400    
Any Aid Previous Year 1.302 1.295 1.288 1.270 
US Military Assistance to 
Recip. 
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Table 7: Pooled Cross Sectional Probit Analysis of Whether a State Received Aid – Canada 
Variable Coefficient (Robust Standard Error in Parentheses) 
 Basic Model Including 
Similarity of UN Votes 
– Recip. &Canada 
Including Similarity 
of Recip.’s UN 
Votes with Both US 
& Canada 
Including Similarity of 
UN Votes – Recip. 
&US 
Including Similarity of 
UN Votes – Recip. 
and Canada, & US 
Military Assistance 
Human Rights  
 
































Canada Imports from 
Recip. 






























-.007    
(.011) 
























UN Policy Similarity - 
Recip. and Canada 
1.521**    
(.520) 




UN Policy Similarity - 



































Alliance  Dropped-collinearity Dropped-collinearity Dropped-collinearity Dropped-collinearity 
Dispute  
 
Dropped-collinearity Dropped-collinearity .000 
(.000) 
Dropped-collinearity 








































US Military Assistance to 
Recip. 
   .000 
(.000) 
Model Significance .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
N 1407  1407 1407 1407 
PPC .57 .58 .54  .58 
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Table 8: Marginal Effects for Significant Variables - Canada 
Variable Marginal Effects On Change in Probability of Receiving Aid of A One-Unit Change in 
Independent Variable 
 Basic Model 
Including Similarity of 
UN Votes – Recip. 
&Canada 
Including Similarity 
of UN Votes – 
Recip. &US 
Including Similarity of 
Recip.’s UN Votes with 
Both US & Canada 
Including Similarity of 
UN Votes – Recip. 
and Canada, & US 
Military Assistance 
Recipient Polity Score .009 .011 .009 .010 
Trade Intersection 
 
-.662 -.584 -.658 -.769 
Canada Exports to 
Recipe. 
-.000 -.0005 -.000  
Oil Exporter 
 
-.566 -.603 -.572  
Population 
 
.000 .000 .000 .000 
UN Policy Similarity - 
Recip. and Canada 
1.521  1.529  
Cold War 
 
-.356 -.516 -.360 -.548 
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